



































This paper empirically analyzes the main microeconomic determinants of two
forms of corruption supply, administrative corruption and state capture, by
Maghrebi ﬁrms. This study is based on a new database of nearly 600 Alge-
rian, Moroccan and Tunisian ﬁrms. I show that tax evasion is a major factor in
the engagement of ﬁrms in administrative corruption. The latter increases with
the share of sales hidden by the ﬁrm as long as it is below half of total sales, and
slightly decreases thereafter. State capture is fostered by a failing enforcement
of property and contract rights. Interestingly, less competitive ﬁrms appear to
engage more in both forms of corruption than the most dynamic ones. After as-
sessing the robustness of my empirical results, I draw a comparison of the factors
of corruption in North Africa, Uganda and transition countries.
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11 Introduction
What are the main microeconomic drivers of ﬁrms’ practices of corruption? In the
existing literature, there is quite a bit of uncertainty on the role played by ﬁrms’
proﬁtability and by tax evasion.
Firms’ competitiveness may aﬀect their practices of corruption in two opposite direc-
tions. On the one hand, the most competitive ﬁrms are the most proﬁtable, enabling
them to pay the highest bribes (Ades and Tella (1999), Bliss and Tella (1997), Clarke
and Xu (2002), Svensson (2003)). On the other hand, the need for making high proﬁts
may be all the more pressing as the ﬁrm’s competitiveness declines, as the latter low-
ers its negotiating power with business partners and bureaucrats (Gupta, Sharan, and
de Mello 2000). In this case, the supply of bribes may well help compensate for a loss
in competitiveness by tweaking the rules of economic activity, in order to reduce some
costs, gain a competitive advantage on other ﬁrms (Gauthier and Reinikka 2001) or
secure public procurement contracts. In sum, do ﬁrms pay bribes because they need
to increase their future proﬁts in order to stay competitive on an increasingly aggres-
sive market or because they are already more competitive and make more proﬁts than
others?
Tax evasion may also have opposite eﬀects on ﬁrms’ corruption behaviors. On the
one hand, ﬁrms hiding a wide share of their sales, in order to circumvent regulations
or avoid taxation, may have to bribe inspectors regularly to maintain their shadow
activity (Hindriks, Keen, and Muthoo 1999). On the other hand, large-scale tax evasion
increases the probability of fraud detection and makes corruption more risky.
As a consequence, the impact of ﬁrms’ proﬁtability and tax evasion on their practices
of corruption is uncertain a priori. This paper proposes to shed new light on the
determinants of ﬁrms’ supply of corruption by focusing on North African ﬁrms for
the ﬁrst time. This study is based on an econometric analysis of an original set of
employer/employee matched data, covering 600 ﬁrms settled in Morocco, Tunisia and
Algeria in 2005 as well as about 6000 of their employees. I also lead comparisons with
other empirical works on this topic and on former-USSR ﬁrms (Hellman, Jones, and
Kaufmann 2000) and Ugandan ﬁrms (Svensson 2003).
Controlling for endogeneity, I show that tax evasion aﬀects corruption. Firms pay
more bribes when they hide a large share of their activity but only if the risk of
detection is low enough1. On the contrary, if evasion is so widespread that this risk
is too high, then administrative corruption tends to lower when hidden sales increase.
Hence tax evasion and administrative corruption are either complements or substitutes,
according to the probability of fraud detection. Another interesting result is that
administrative corruption and state capture are both linked negatively with ﬁrms’
proﬁtability, contradicting the results obtained by Svensson (2003), Clarke and Xu
1Following Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1996) who ﬁrst developed the economic theory of crime, the
seminal theory of corruption predicts that managers maximize ﬁrms’ proﬁts, net of bribes and make
decisions on bribe-payments based on the analysis of expected returns which are a function of the
likelihood of detection and severity of punishment (Ades and Tella (1997), Rose-Ackerman (1978)).
2(2002) and Bliss and Tella (1997). The ﬁrms that are most engaged in corruption are
the least competitive ones and not those with the highest proﬁts. The supply of bribes
corresponds more to a need for securing future proﬁts than to an ability to pay bribes
due to high current proﬁts.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, I present the analytical framework and
the context. The data are described in Section 3. Then, the econometric model and
the method are exposed (Section 4). In Section 5, I report and comment the results
obtained through ordered probit estimations. Section 6 is composed of robustness
tests. I draw a comparison of these results on Maghrebi ﬁrms with results obtained on
Ugandan and former-USSR ﬁrms in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 Framework
2.1 Analytical Framework
Firms’ supply of bribery is usually attributed to three major factors: (i) the extent
of tax evasion or shadow activity (Johnson et al. (2000), Vostroknutova (2003), Hibbs
and Piculescu (2005), Goerke (2006)); (ii) failures of the legal system – excessive reg-
ulation and weak enforcement of property rights – (Tanzi (1998), Hellman, Jones, and
Kaufmann (2000)); (iii) the ﬁrm’s strong or weak competitiveness (Bardhan (2006),
Svensson (2003), Ades and Tella (1999), Bliss and Tella (1997)). I will review the the-
oretical framework and empirical results of each of these factors, and derive hypotheses
and predictions for the analysis.
The complementarity between tax evasion and corruption can be grasped both at
a macro- and microeconomic level. From a macroeconomic standpoint, the more
widespread tax evasion in a given economy, the more restricted the tax base. This
reinforces corruption through two channels, the supply side from ﬁrms and the de-
mand side from bureaucrats. On the one hand, tax evasion leads the government to
increase the level of taxes paid by ﬁrms which do pay them. This may encourage them
to pay more bribes in order to reduce the amount of taxes they pay. On the other
hand, tax evasion decreases the total amount of levied taxes, which aﬀects the quality
of public services: less paid or less monitored public oﬃcials are more tempted by cor-
ruption, and property and contract rights are enforced less (Johnson, Kaufmann, and
Zoido-Lobaton 1999). From a microeconomic standpoint, the size of bribes paid to a
tax inspector are determined by ﬁrms’ desire to keep part of their activity undeclared
(Hindriks, Keen, and Muthoo 1999).
Tax evasion may also aﬀect the supply of bribes in the opposite direction. A ﬁrm which
hides a large share of their sales may want to pay fewer bribes in order to lower the
risk of being caught (Goerke 2006). Tax evasion and corruption are then substitutes.
Studies on the link between shadow activity and corruption are still quite rare. They are
mostly macroeconomic and focus on the analysis of these phenomena in former-USSR
3countries (Johnson et al. (2000), Vostroknutova (2003)). The literature on the topic
does not provide a clearcut view on either the complementarity or the substitutability
between tax evasion and corruption.
I make here the hypothesis that tax evasion and corruption are complements for ﬁrms
as long as the risk of being caught is below a certain threshold, determined by the
share of their sales that ﬁrms do not declare. Below this threshold, ﬁrms pay bribes in
proportion of their hidden activity. Above the threshold, when ﬁrms hide a wide part
of their activity, the probability of being caught considered is too high, tax evasion and
corruption are then substitutes for two major reasons: (i) large-scale tax evasion makes
it too risky to practice corruption as well, (ii) tax evasion lowers costs linked with regu-
lation and taxation to such an extent that corruption with this purpose is less necessary.
The failure of the legal system is put forward in most empirical studies on the main
determinants of ﬁrms’ practices of corruption – in particular the role played by the
level of taxation, the regulatory quality and the enforcement of property rights.
Many of these studies attribute corruption to the monopolistic and discretionary power
of the oﬃcials in charge of authorizing or inspecting activities subject to regulations
or taxation. Rules and regulations (licenses, permits, authorizations) give bureaucrats
higher opportunities to use their public discretionary power to extract bribes when i)
they are vague and not transparent, ii) they require frequent contacts between citizens
and bureaucrats iii) and there is no competition in the granting of these authorizations
(Tanzi 1998). Svensson (2003) also reports that Ugandan ﬁrms pay higher bribes when
they face higher levels of taxation, and more restrictive regulations, since then the
bureaucrats’ “control rights” are wider.
Furthermore, in former USSR countries, state capture and administrative corruption
are shown to rise with a weak enforcement of property rights, which reveals the inca-
pacity of courts to implement the law (Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton 1998).
Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2000) examine the determinants of administrative
corruption and state capture, especially the impact of judicial uncertainty on the prac-
tices of corruption of Eastern Europe and CIS countries. They show that ﬁrms facing
uncertainty concerning their contract and property rights tend to engage more in both
forms of corruption. A weak law enforcement favors corruption for two main reasons.
First, corruption helps these ﬁrms overcome the diﬃculties due to the weak enforce-
ment of their rights. This is particularly true in a context where the state does not
provide a legal framework favorable to competition. Corruption is then less frequently
or severely punished.
In this paper, I examine whether a failing legal system favors both state capture and
administrative corruption in North African countries as well.
As for the link between competitiveness and corruption, it mainly has given rise either
to theoretical studies (Ades and Tella (1999), Bliss and Tella (1997)) or to research
on transition countries (Clarke and Xu 2002), with an exception: Svensson’s paper on
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competitiveness on their practices of corruption.
Various studies show that a ﬁrm’s competitiveness fosters its supply of bribes. Bliss
and Tella (1997) analyze a private form of corruption, “surplus-shifting corruption”,
where ﬁrms spend part of their proﬁts as bribes to public oﬃcials in order to maintain
their activity: it is a form of “racket”.2 They show that private corruption increases
with ﬁrms’ proﬁtability. When the least competitive ﬁrms exit from the market, the
proﬁtability of those remaining increases, which enables corrupt bureaucrats to exact
higher bribes. Thus, more competition between ﬁrms may strengthen corruption by
increasing the proﬁtability of the ﬁrms which stay on the market. Svensson (2003)
highlights the same impact of ﬁrms’ proﬁtability or competitiveness on their supply
of bribes in Uganda. The underlying idea that the most proﬁtable ﬁrms have more
resources to pay bribes and engage more in corruption is also put forward by Ades and
Tella (1999) and Clarke and Xu (2002) for East European and Central Asian countries.
On the contrary, Gauthier and Reinikka (2001) suggest that resorting to corruption
may help ﬁrms counterbalance a competitive disadvantage. This is the hypothesis I
test in the remainder of this paper: when a ﬁrm loses market share, it may tend to
pay more bribes to gain public procurement contracts or reduce its costs. In this case,
corruption is an investment, one which is more or less proﬁtable, that the ﬁrm makes
in order to increase its competitiveness and stay on the market.
To sum up, previous studies on ﬁrms’ practices of corruption emphasize three major
facts: i) tax evasion and corruption may be either complements or substitutes; ii) re-
strictive regulation and taxation and insuﬃcient enforcement of property rights are
strong determinants of the supply of corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia,
where state capture and administrative corruption also depend on ﬁrms’ characteris-
tics: size, type of ownership, etc.; iii) like tax evasion, the ﬁrm’s competitiveness or
proﬁtability has an uncertain impact on the supply of bribes.
The data I use and present below enable me to test the following three hypotheses in
the context of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia: (i) corruption ﬁrst increases and then
decreases with the ﬁrm’s tax evasion; (ii) corruption is more widespread when property
rights are weakly enforced; (iii) corruption decreases with the ﬁrm’s competitiveness.
2.2 Context
In the 2000s, Maghrebi countries have carried out large-scale reforms. Competition has
strengthened concurrently with the transition towards market economy, trade openness
and the increase in capital ﬂows. The liberalization of the economy has been reinforced
by various free-trade agreements signed by the three countries. Besides bilateral and
regional agreements, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia have all ratiﬁed the European Union
2Bliss and Tella (1997) make a distinction between “surplus-shifting corruption” and “cost-reducing
corruption”; the latter occurs when a tax inspector reduces costs for a ﬁrm which bribes him.
5Association Agreement (EUAA). At the time of the survey, the agreement has come
into eﬀect only in Tunisia and Morocco (in 1998 and 2000 respectively), and not yet
in Algeria.
In this context, at the time of the survey, Morocco and Tunisia have strengthened
dramatically the reforms aiming to reinforce the competitiveness of their ﬁrms, diver-
sify their production and attract more foreign direct investments. In Algeria, struc-
tural reforms aiming to promote the private sector, especially privatization, have been
delayed. In Morocco, although they have favored economic openness, foreign trade
reforms started in the middle of the 1980s have not been able to curb the loss of com-
petitiveness of Moroccan ﬁrms in the 1990s. In the three countries, the liberalization
of the economy increased competition on the domestic market by alleviating trade bar-
riers, speeding up privatization and redeﬁning the role of the state. Maghrebi ﬁrms
suﬀer from a relative disadvantage compared to their competitors (mostly European
ﬁrms). Hence, they seem to have suﬀered from economic openness so far, losing do-
mestic market share and not expanding on the foreign market yet. These ﬁrms have to
face new constraints and adapt their behaviors to this changing and increasingly more
competitive environment.
In parallel, the level of corruption, as measured by the GRICS index published by the
World Bank, has somehow stagnated in Maghreb between 1996 and 2005. On a scale
from -2.5 to 2.5, with 2.5 being the lowest level of corruption, it has increased very
slightly in Morocco and Algeria and decreased slightly in Tunisia – moving from 0.26
to -0.09, from -0.35 to -0.43 and from -0.03 to 0.13 respectively. Corruption remains
relatively widespread in North African countries, which creates additional uncertainties
and costs for ﬁrms, thereby hampering economic activity. Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria
respectively range 43rd, 78th and 97th out of 159 countries according to the Transparency
International Corruption Perceptions Index in 2005.
3 Data
3.1 Denitions
This analysis focuses on two main forms of corruption. Administrative corruption refers
to bribes given in order to inﬂuence the application of laws and regulations aﬀecting
ﬁrms’ business. State capture accounts for the payment of bribes in order to inﬂuence
the content of laws and regulations (Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann 2000).
I also examine shadow activity of recorded ﬁrms, recorded in the trade register. In
the literature, this shadow activity might be labeled as informal activity (Johnson
et al. (2000), Vostroknutova (2003)) but this term may encompass both hidden sales
of recorded ﬁrms and activities of unrecorded ﬁrms, potentially introducing confusion.
Given that ﬁrms hide part of their sales to avoid taxation or regulation (Loayza 1996),
I refer to this phenomenon as tax evasion, as in Gauthier, Azam, and Goyette (2004),
6Sanyal, Gang, and Goswami (2000), Gauthier and Gersovitz (1997). In this paper, I
measure tax evasion by the percentage of their sales that ﬁrms do not declare.
3.2 The Survey
To measure these phenomena, I use an original data set computed by ROSES (Uni-
versit´ e Paris 1 / CNRS), with the participation of the Forum Euromditerranen des
Instituts de Sciences conomiques (FEMISE). This data set is based on matched sur-
veys employer/employee carried out in 2004-2005 in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco.
The surveys involved about 200 ﬁrms in each country and about 10 employees per
ﬁrm. In total the database compounds 582 ﬁrms and 5682 employees. It includes,
among others, a set of questions on tax evasion and on the ﬁrms’ perceptions of cor-
ruption, regulation, taxes, competitiveness, and enforcement of their property rights,
etc.
3.3 Measuring Perceptions
The key variables (corruption, tax evasion, quality of the judicial system) are measured
in the survey by questions on perceptions. In particular, the questions on corruption
and tax evasion are formulated as follows: “Do ﬁrms like yours...?”. The purpose
of this formulation is to reveal the ﬁrm’s own behavior by bypassing self-censorship,
from which all surveys on illicit or socially condemned practices suﬀer, be it drugs,
criminality, alcoholism, corruption... The idea is that one feels freer to answer if one is
not directly concerned by the question, but that the answer is largely guided by one’s
own practices.3 This wording is similar to the one of the BEEPS surveys on transition
countries (Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann 2000) and of the 1998 Ugandan enterprise
survey (Reinikka and Svensson 2003). This enables me to avoid the respondent fearing
the consequences of disclosing his own illegal behaviors, and to draw comparisons
between the microeconomic determinants of corruption in North-Africa, former-USSR
and Uganda.
There is of course a risk that the information we get by using formulations like “Firms
like yours” or “Firms in your sector” may reﬂect collective representations, that may
not be fully accurate. We may also collect strategic rather than real answers. This may
particularly aﬀect questions on taxes, regulations or public services, from ﬁrms willing
to inﬂuence policy choices. It will be taken into account in the analysis. Finally, this
survey has the advantage of providing a unique microeconomic database on institutions
and diﬀerent forms of corruption in three Maghrebi countries.
The questions used to deﬁne the variables under study are reproduced in Table 9 in
Appendix. This table also provides the main descriptive statistics of these variables.
3This type of phrasing is one of the most commonly used in surveys where respondents are asked
about illegal or immoral behavior, and especially about corruption practices (Clarke 2011).
7The questions concerning corruption and tax evasion receive fewer responses than the
other questions. As for administrative corruption and state capture, the median is
below the mean. This is probably due to the fact that many ﬁrms that answer the
question minimize the phenomenon. When a question is found to be embarrassing, the
respondent can choose not to answer or to answer “no” to “protect itself”. However,
I have enough answers and their standard errors are suﬃciently high to perform a
statistical and econometric analysis of hidden activities (corruption and tax evasion).
4 Econometric Model, Method and Expectations
I use the data presented above to estimate the following model which regresses two
diﬀerent dimensions of corruption – state capture and administrative corruption – on
several factors4:
Corrupi = β0 + β1Evasioni + β2Evasion
2
i + β3PropRightsi + β4Competi
+ β5Reguli + β6Taxi + β7Controli + θi (1)
where Corrupi represents either state capture (Capturei) or for administrative corrup-
tion (Admcorri). Evasion stands for tax evasion. It is measured by the percentage
of sales that the ﬁrm does not declare. PropRightsi is a dummy variable referring
to ﬁrm i’s perception of the respect for its property and contract rights three years
before. Competi is a dummy which indicates the ﬁrm’s competitiveness, proxied by
the increase of the ﬁrm’s market share over the previous two years. It is thus a dy-
namic measure of the change in the ﬁrm’s competitiveness over time rather than a
static measure of its proﬁtability like in Svensson (2003). Reguli stands for regulations
aﬀecting the ﬁrms. It is equal to 1 if the ﬁrm fully respects ﬁscal regulations. Taxi
gives the amount of corporate taxes as a percentage of the ﬁrm’s sales. Controli en-
compasses diﬀerent control variables according to the sub-model which measures the
ﬁrm’s characteristics: its capital (Capitali), the ﬁnancial stake of the state in the ﬁrm
(PubCapitali), a dummy equal to one if the ﬁrm has ever been state-owned in the
past (FormPublici), the number of its employees (Nbempi), the respondent’s status
in the ﬁrm (CEOi) the ﬁrm’s country of origin (Tunisiai, Moroccoi, Algeriai), its
sector (InsurFini, Hoteli, Transporti, Tradei, BuildIndi, FoodIndi, ChemicIndi,
TextilIndi, ElecIndi).
I expect ﬁrms which hide a large share of their sales to oﬀer more bribes in order to
maintain part of their activity in the shadow sector. But, as mentioned in section 3, I
assume that the relation between administrative corruption and tax evasion is an in-
verted U-shape: increasing below a certain threshold of tax evasion, slightly decreasing
above. When the share of hidden sales is low, increasing evasion leads ﬁrms to pay
4Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables and of the main regressors are provided in ﬁgures
2 and 3 respectively in the Appendix.
8bribes more frequently to “buy” controls and inspections. Corruption and tax evasion
are then complementary. But for ﬁrms hiding a large part of their sales, i) increasing it
enables them to avoid controls and regulations, and makes corruption less attractive;
ii) the risk of being caught is higher, and ﬁrms limit their supply of bribes in order to
limit the additional risk of detection due to corruption, tax evasion and corruption are
then substitutes. To take this into account, I introduce a quadratic term. I expect β1
to be positive and β2 to be negative.
The analysis of the impact of tax evasion on corruption may suﬀer from an endogeneity
bias. I test and control for this possibility in Section 6. The results suggest that tax
evasion is exogenous in this analysis, mainly because of the nature and deﬁnition of
the variables used.
Through bribes given to justice or police oﬃcers or inspectors, ﬁrms may “buy” the
protection of their property and contract rights when the legal system cannot ensure
it. The coeﬃcient β3 is then expected to be negative.
One of the main hypotheses I make is that weakly competitive ﬁrms should be more
tempted to resort to bribery to distort the rules of competition. On the contrary,
a monopolistic ﬁrm, with a high market share does not need to bribe oﬃcials to get
public procurement on its line of business since it has no competitors. I expect β4 to be
negative. More precisely, to measure a ﬁrm’s competitiveness, I use a dummy equal to
one if its market share has remained stable or increased during the last two years. This
has two main advantages: i) it relies on real facts rather than on assumptions such as
the index of demand elasticity used by Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2000); ii) since
it relies on past event, it may be less subject to simultaneity with the measurement of
corruption than a measure based on current events.5
Bribes can also enable ﬁrms to circumvent restrictive taxation and regulation. Tax eva-
sion, regulation and taxation make it necessary to control for their existence (for the
former) or implementation (for the latter two). Svensson (2003) refers to these as “con-
trol rights” which enable public agents (mainly inspectors) to enter into transactions,
hence into negotiations with ﬁrms. I thus expect β5 and β6 to be positive.
I expect ﬁrms in which the State has a ﬁnancial stake to beneﬁt from privileged links
with public oﬃcials. Such links may enable ﬁrms to inﬂuence the content and ap-
plication of laws and regulations without having to buy such an inﬂuence, that is to
say without having to engage in state capture (Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann 2000).
They may practice less corruption and less often. The analysis by Hellman, Jones,
and Kaufmann (2000) of former USSR ﬁrms also suggests that small ﬁrms (with fewer
than 50 employees) tend to engage in administrative corruption rather than in state
capture, probably because the former is less costly. Hence, I expect the size of the ﬁrm,
as well as its capital, to aﬀect positively state capture and negatively administrative
corruption. Moreover, it seems necessary to control for respondents’ characteristics.
5Another endogeneity bias may result from this relation between competitiveness and corruption.
However, it is not very likely that a ﬁrm which engages more in corruption loses more market shares
than others.
9It is likely indeed that those who have a position with high responsibilities are more
reluctant to be totally transparent on their ﬁrm’s practices of corruption. Corruption
supply may diﬀer between sectors. Industrial sectors, in which projects involve large
amounts of money or highly rent-generating public procurement, may be more favor-
able to corruption, in particular to state capture. Finally, ﬁrms located in Tunisia may
suﬀer from political pressure more than in Algeria and Morocco and report corruption
less easily.
The results I expect from the econometric estimation of the models and presented
above are displayed in the following table.
Table 1: Expected Signs of the Factors of Corruption
Explanatory Variables State Capture Administrative Corruption
Tax Evasion (+) (∩)
Competitiveness (-) (-)
Enforcement of Property Rights (-) (-)
Regulation (+) (+)
Taxes (+) (+)
Part of the State in the Capital (-) (-)
Capital (+) (-)
CEO (-) (-)
Number of Employees (+) (-)
Tunisia (-) (-)
Industrial sectors (+) (+)
I use ordered probit models to estimate these diﬀerent eﬀects. Indeed, the dependent
variables - administrative corruption and state capture - are indexed between 1 and
6, hence are discrete and ordered. A ﬁrm’s engagements in administrative corruption
and in state capture are respectively measured by the following questions: “Do ﬁrms
like yours usually have to give public oﬃcials unoﬃcial payments to be able to work?”
and “Do ﬁrms like yours have to give public oﬃcials unoﬃcial payments to inﬂuence
the content of a law or regulation?” The answer might be 1: never; 2: seldom; 3:
sometimes; 4: often; 5: mostly; or 6: always. A multinomial probit model would
then neglect the ordinality of the explained variable, while a linear regression would
consider the gap between indices 3 and 4 similar as the one between indices 1 and 2,
whereas these only refer to a ranking position. In these two cases, I would not obtain
consistent estimators. Therefore, the models generally used when dealing with that
kind of variables are ordered probit and logit models. 6
The large number of missing values in corruption data (36% for administrative corrup-
tion and 41% for state capture) suggests that there might be a selection bias. I control
for this possibility in Section 6 and show that in either case, the selection bias is not
signiﬁcant. Thus, I use classical ordered probit estimations.
6Probit and logit models are based on an estimation of a continuous latent variable, underlying
the ranked variable under study. In an ordered probit model, the residual associated with this latent
variable is supposed to have a standard normal distribution.
105 Main Results
In the following section, I report the results of estimations of the impact of several
explanatory factors, among which tax evasion, competitiveness and enforcement of
property rights on two diﬀerent dimensions of corruption: state capture and adminis-
trative corruption.
I ﬁrst estimate the model with all the variables of interest and relevant control variables
according to the analysis framework and then check that the results are stable when
dropping insigniﬁcant variables. I then add sector dummies and drop the variables
which are not signiﬁcant ﬁrst at the 15%, then at the 10% level. In the core of the
paper, I only present the initial (unrestricted) and ﬁnal speciﬁcations (see Table 2).
The full procedure leading from the initial speciﬁcation of the models to the ﬁnal ones
is presented in the Appendix, in Tables 10 and 11.
5.1 State Capture
The coeﬃcients obtained for β are not equal to the marginal eﬀects of the explanatory
variables on the conditional probabilities. The marginal eﬀects ∂y/∂xk of explanatory
variables included respectively in model 1.rest and 2.rest are provided in Tables 3 and
4.7. For dummy variables, ∂y/∂xk stands for a discrete change of the variable from 0
to 1.
The frequency of state capture is not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by variations of the extent
of tax evasion8. For equal levels of capital, the positive impact of tax evasion on state
capture is not signiﬁcant. This may be due to the high correlation between capital and
state capture (this correlation is negative as shown in Table 2), and between capital
and tax evasion (the correlation is also negative, as in Gauthier and Reinikka (2001)):
small-capital ﬁrms engage more both in tax evasion and in state capture. The size of
capital is a better predictor of state capture than undeclared sales, and state capture
does not clearly emerge, either as a complement, or as a substitute for tax evasion.
Competitiveness appears to be one of the most relevant factors of state capture by
North African ﬁrms. The eﬀect I bring to the fore is opposite to the one highlighted in
Svensson (2003) and Bliss and Tella (1997), and consistent with Gauthier and Reinikka
(2001). Our main result is that, whatever the frequency, competitive ﬁrms always have
a lower probability of paying bribes. This pattern is reinforced by the high magnitude of
the marginal eﬀect on the modality Never: competitive ﬁrms have a 15 percentage point
higher probability of never paying bribes. Strikingly, once they engage in corruption,
7However, these ﬁgures must be evaluated with caution since estimators are consistent only under
the assumption that the error terms have a normal distribution.
8However, the coeﬃcient associated with the extent of tax evasion is signiﬁcantly positive when
not controlling for the stock of capital of the ﬁrm. The higher the proportion of a ﬁrm’s sales which
are not declared, the more likely it is to give bribes to inﬂuence the content of new laws, probably
laws aiming for instance at punishing hidden activities.
11Table 2: Ordered Probit Estimations: Initial and Final Models
Model 1.unrest 1.rest 2.unrest 2.rest
Explanatory State Administrative
Variables Capture Corruption
Evasion:10 1 0.35 0.47b 0.38a
(0.23) (0.18) (0.09)
Evasion2:10 3 -0.44 -0.39 -0.33b
Main (0.35) (0.26) (0.13)
Compet -0.78a -0.69a -0.46c -0.53a
(0.23) (0.18) (0.26) (0.19)








Capital:10 9 -0.75b -0.30b -0.07 -0.07a
(0.35) (0.14) (0.05) (0.02)
CEO 0.32 0.44b 0.22
(0.25) (0.17) (0.27)
Firms' Nbemp:10 2 -0.08 -0.19b -0.16a
Characteristics (0.07) (0.08) (0.06)






Tunisia 0.36 -0.34c 0.02











Observations 110 217 116 213
Log-Likelihood -112.4 -239.2 -133.6 -277.5
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: a denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level, b at the
5% level and c at 10%. Residuals heteroscedasticity is corrected with White’s
method.
the diﬀerence in the probability of paying bribes between competitive and declining
ﬁrms decreases with the frequency of bribes. However, this secondary result is not
12Table 3: Marginal Eﬀects for State Capture
Frequency of State Capture
Never Seldom Sometimes Often Mostly Always
Compet 15.74 -8.49 -4.26 -1.44 -1.17 -0.38
PropRights 7.18 -4.17 -1.87 -0.58 -0.44 -0.13
Capital:10 9 5.53 -3.31 -1.41 -0.42 -0.31 -0.08
CEO -9.04 5.17 2.38 0.75 0.58 0.17
Tunisia 5.81 -3.56 -1.45 -0.42 -0.30 -0.08
InsurFin 16.49 -10.67 -3.83 -1.06 -0.74 -0.19
Observations 217 217 217 217 217 217
Notes: Marginal eﬀects are given at the mean point of continuous explanatory
variables, and for discrete change from 0 to 1 of dummy variables
(noted ). The ﬁgures are reported in percentage points.
robust to the estimation of a multinomial choice model (see Section 6), while the main
result, that competitive ﬁrms have a lower probability of paying bribes at all, is robust
under all speciﬁcations.
A possible interpretation is that a ﬁrm’s loss of competitiveness on its market may
prompt it to turn to bribery in order to inﬂuence to its advantage the content of laws
and regulations aﬀecting it, so as to try and win back part of its market share or to
get public procurements. Since the question is asked indirectly, there is of course the
possibility that less competitive ﬁrms tend to overstate corruption as a justiﬁcation for
their diﬃculties. However, the measurement of corruption is strictly identical to the
one used by Svensson (2003) who obtains opposite results.
State capture signiﬁcantly decreases with the enforcement of property and contract
rights. These results converge with those of Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2000) on
former USSR countries. Firms whose property and contract rights are not enforced
or are badly enforced, may bribe inﬂuential bureaucrats either to correct the injustice
or to settle compensatory mechanisms for their relative drawback. Hence, state-level
corruption may be a way to reduce additional transaction costs due to a failing en-
forcement of law. Changing from low to high enforcement of property rights decreases
by 7.18 percentage points the probability of never having to give unoﬃcial payments
to inﬂuence the content of laws.
Then the higher the amount of the ﬁrm’s capital, the less likely its engagement in state
capture. This casts doubt upon the argument that the ﬁrms which are more involved
in corruption in general and in state capture in particular are those with the highest
resources. On the contrary, small ﬁrms, in ﬁnancial terms, being more vulnerable
to current crises and competition, turn more frequently to state capture to protect
themselves or carve out a place.
The sign of the coeﬃcient associated with the respondent’s professional status gives
interesting information. Surprisingly, the higher the responsibility of the respondent,
the more likely he is to declare that the ﬁrm often gives unoﬃcial payments to modify
13the content of laws and regulations, that is to say that the ﬁrm practices state capture.
The ﬁrst interpretation of these results may be given by the secret nature of corrup-
tion. The reason why chief executive oﬃcers are more aware than directors of human
resources of their ﬁrm’s practice of state capture, may be that the latter have little
access to such information or activities which rather directly involve CEOs. A second
interpretation might be that even if they know such practices, employees are less ready
to reveal them because of their fear of being “punished” by their superiors, if not ﬁred.
I also introduce dummies controlling for speciﬁc eﬀects of the country or of the sector
of the major line of business. I notice only two signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. Being settled
in Tunisia reduces the propensity of ﬁrms to seek to inﬂuence the formulation of laws
through bribes. This may have two interpretations: i) state capture is more widespread
in Algeria and Morocco than in Tunisia; ii) Tunisian ﬁrms being more subject to po-
litical pressure than Algerian and Moroccan ones report and expose less easily corrupt
practices. The latter explanation seems more likely given the authoritarian Tunisian
political context. Finally, the only sector with signiﬁcantly lower levels of state capture
is the one of insurance and ﬁnance. This might be due to lower rent-generating public
procurement in service sectors, and in this one in particular, than in industry sectors,
together with more transparent interactions with incumbents.
In brief, the results show that North African ﬁrms are more willing to engage in state
capture when their market share decreases, when their property and contract rights
are badly enforced, and when they have small amounts of capital, as a whole when
their activity is more threatened by competition.
5.2 Administrative Corruption
As expected, administrative corruption is linked to tax evasion through a quadratic
relation (ﬁrst increasing then slightly decreasing). Hence, the global marginal eﬀect
of tax evasion on administrative corruption, GEvasion, needs to be recalculated from
the ﬁgures obtained for the marginal eﬀects of Evasion.10−1 and Evasion2.10−3.
The signs of the coeﬃcient associated with the single term and the quadratic term
of tax evasion indicates that administrative corruption ﬁrst increases up to a certain
threshold before slightly declining. Figure 1 suggests that the threshold is at about 55%
of undeclared sales. Below this threshold, giving unoﬃcial payments might therefore
be a way to keep part of the sales hidden, in order to avoid paying some taxes. Hence,
the dimension of corruption that is emphasized is a “surplus-shifting corruption” (Bliss
and Tella 1997) which enables the survival of a business that would probably disap-
pear without bribes. Above the threshold of 55%, the higher the percentage of sales
undeclared, the lower the probability that ﬁrms give bribes to public oﬃcials.
The global marginal eﬀect reported in Table 4 indicates that a one percent increase in
undeclared sales reduces by 1.18 percentage points the probability of never having to
give bribes to inﬂuence the application of regulations aﬀecting the ﬁrm’s business; it
increases by 0.26 points the probability of having to give some most of the time.
14Table 4: Marginal Eﬀects for Administrative Corruption
Frequency of Administrative Corruption
Never Seldom Sometimes Often Mostly Always
Evasion:10 1 -14.78 2.69 5.37 2.72 3.30 0.71
Evasion2:10 3 12.67 -2.31 -4.60 -2.33 -2.83 -0.60
GEvasion -1.18 0.21 0.43 0.22 0.26 0.06
Compet 20.76 -2.74 -7.04 -4.04 -5.51 -1.42
Capital:10 10 2.79 -0.51 -1.01 -0.51 -0.62 -0.13
Nbemp:10 2 6.06 -1.10 -2.20 -1.11 -1.35 -0.29
InsurFin 47.97 -16.17 -17.55 -6.53 -6.56 -1.17
Hotel 30.70 -9.27 -11.67 -4.53 -4.49 -0.74
Transport 28.06 -8.43 -10.70 -4.16 -4.10 -0.67
BuildInd -23.31 1.83 7.22 4.77 7.28 2.20
Notes: Marginal eﬀects are given at the mean point of continuous explanatory
variables, and for discrete change from 0 to 1 of dummy variables
(noted ). The ﬁgures are reported in percentage points. GEvasion
stands for the global marginal eﬀect of the variable of Tax Evasion.
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As with state capture, the ﬁrm’s competitiveness, proxied by the variation of its mar-
ket share, has a negative impact on administrative corruption. If the market share of
ﬁrms increases or is stable, i.e. if it is competitive, the probability that it practices
administrative corruption is signiﬁcantly lower than for less competitive ﬁrms. Cor-
ruption hampers less the long-term expansion strategy of competitive ﬁrms since they
enjoy a strong position on their market. On the contrary, less competitive ﬁrms might
15be more tempted to resort to unoﬃcial payments to compensate for their weak com-
petitive position. This rather highlights the “cost-reducing” dimension of corruption.
Contrary to what Svensson (2003) shows for Ugandan ﬁrms and to what Bliss and
Tella (1997) explain in their theoretical model, this study suggests that North African
ﬁrms which engage more often in corruption are not the most proﬁtable ones but the
least competitive ones.
Results on the capital of the ﬁrm and the number of its employees show that admin-
istrative corruption mostly concerns small ﬁrms, in ﬁnancial terms and in terms of
workforce, in keeping with what has been observed in Eastern Europe and Central
Asia.
Finally, administrative corruption is more discriminating between sectors than state
capture. Firms whose main activity is in a service sector except trade (insurance and
ﬁnancial services, hotel and restaurant, transport) are less likely to engage in admin-
istrative corruption than others. By contrast, those which have their main activity in
building are signiﬁcantly more inclined to petty corruption. Indeed, inspections are
more frequent in this line of business in particular, and in industry in general, than in
services, which increases incumbents’ control rights, hence bribing opportunities.
As a whole, ﬁrms’ engagement in administrative corruption is mainly determined by
the extent to which they evade taxes. Administrative corruption increases with the
percentage of hidden sales until this percentage reaches about one half, then admin-
istrative corruption decreases with the rise in tax evasion. It is pushed up by the
weakness of their competitiveness but it does not seem to be sensitive to the security
of property rights, contrary to state capture.
6 Robustness Tests
In the following section, I seek to ascertain the robustness of these results on the main
determinants of state capture and administrative corruption. I focus on two potential
sources of instability: the ranking of answers to the frequency of corruption and the
existence of a selection bias.
6.1 Nature of the dependent variable
First, the distribution of both variables measuring the supply of corruption is not nor-
mal. Hence, the results on their determinants might be speciﬁc to such a distribution.
To check if the results presented in the previous section hold with diﬀerent distribu-
tions of the variables of corruption, I use alternative cuts of the modalities of
state capture and administrative corruption. Instead of six modalities, I cut the vari-
ables of corruption into four by gathering the last three modalities (“often”, “mostly”
and “always”) into a single one (the ﬁrst three modalities are “never”, “seldom” and
“sometimes”). I regress such variables of state capture and administrative corruption
16on the variables of their respective restrictive model. The coeﬃcients thus estimated
by ordered probit are presented in Table 5 (models 1.rest∗ and 2.rest∗).
Second, when using ordered probit estimations in section 5, the underlying assumption
is that corruption supply from North African ﬁrms is graduated. Yet, ﬁrms’ engage-
ment in corruption might not be progressive. If the relevant decision for a ﬁrm is
whether to engage in corruption or not, rather than the frequency of engagement, then
a binomial choice model would ﬁt better. Hence, I present the results of probit esti-
mations in the following table in models 1.rest∗∗ and 2.rest∗∗.
Table 5: Robustness Estimations
Model 1.rest 1.rest 1.rest 2.rest 2.rest 2.rest
Explanatory State Administrative
Variables Capture Corruption
Evasion:10 1 0.38a 0.48a 0.71a
(0.09) (0.10) (0.13)
Evasion2:10 3 -0.33b -0.45a -0.71a
Main (0.13) (0.13) (0.18)
Compet -0.69a -0.60a -0.46a -0.53a -0.42b -0.23c
(0.18) (0.18) (0.16) (0.19) (0.20) (0.13)
PropRights -0.36b -0.33c 0.03
(0.18) (0.18) (0.16)
Capital:10 9 -0.30b -0.30b -0.30b -0.07a -0.07a -0.05b
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Firms' CEO 0.44b 0.43b 0.57a
Characteristics (0.17) (0.18) (0.18)
Nbemp:10 2 -0.16a -0.14b -0.12b
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Country Tunisia -0.34c -0.33c -0.33
(0.20) (0.21) (0.21)
InsurFin:101 -0.76a -0.79a -1.00a -0.80a -0.76a -1.00a
(0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
Hotel:101 -0.10b -0.10b -0.10c
Sector (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Transport -0.91c -0.88c -0.63
(0.52) (0.52) (0.62)
BuildInd 0.59b 1.05b 1.00a
(0.26) (0.47) (0.00)
Observations 217 217 210 213 213 200
Log-Likelihood -239.2 -215.75 -126.18 -277.5 -226.00 -109.93
Method oprobit oprobit probit oprobit oprobit probit
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: a denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level, b at the 5%
level and c at 10%. Residuals heteroscedasticity is corrected with White’s method.
It seems that the results presented above for both state capture and administrative
corruption are not sensitive to the number of modalities of these two variables. For
4-cut ordered answers, all coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at least at the 10% level and their
values are very close to those obtained with six modalities.
17As for probit estimations, they show that the main factors of the frequency of both
forms of corruption are also relevant in explaining ﬁrms’ decision on whether to engage
in corruption or not. Competitive and high-capital ﬁrms are less likely to turn both
to state capture and administrative corruption, in the same way as, when they do so,
they are less likely to resort frequently to corruption. The quadratic relation between
tax evasion and administrative corruption is also valid.
There are minor diﬀerences with previous results (1.rest and 2.rest). The enforcement
of property and contract rights does not signiﬁcantly explain the decision of being
involved in state capture. It means that the quality of the legal system aﬀects the
frequency of state capture rather than its occurrence.
Third, the frequency of engagement in corruption of a ﬁrm might not be progressive
or ordered. In this case, a multinomial choice model would be preferable. In Tables
6 and 7, I provide robustness tests based on multinomial logit estimations: models
1.rest∗∗∗ and 2.rest∗∗∗. The coeﬃcients give the relative probability of ﬁrms engaging
in corruption with a certain frequency by comparison with no corruption.
Table 6: Multinomial Logit Estimation: State Capture
Model 1.rest
Explanatory Dependent Variable: State Capture
Variables Seldom Sometimes Often Mostly Always
Compet -1.18a -1.99a -1.08a -2.20a -3.73a
(0.35) (0.37) (0.38) (0.56) (1.23)
PropRights -0.08 -0.13 -2.07a -1.67a -2.65b
(0.38) (0.33) (0.61) (0.58) (1.20)
Capital:10 9 -0.46 -0.75 -0.30 -1.99 -0.09b
(0.36) (0.81) (0.35) (2.14) (0.04)
CEO 0.43 0.69 -0.11 0.72 1.44c
(0.42) (0.43) (0.67) (0.63) (0.76)
Tunisia -1.11b -0.27 -1.67 -0.11 -33.95a
(0.54) (0.48) (1.13) (0.81) (0.60)
InsurFin:101 -3.64a -3.57a -3.47a -3.38a -3.23a
(0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.16)
Observations 217
Log-Likelihood -229.59
Notes: The reference modality stands for never being involved in state capture.
By hypothesis, all the coeﬃcients of such a modality are null. Standard
errors in parentheses: a denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level, b at the
5% level and c at 10%. Residuals heteroscedasticity is corrected with
White’s method.
Our main results on the impact of the ﬁrm’s competitiveness and the enforcement of its
property rights on state capture are robust. However, contrary to the result obtained
with an ordered probit, it seems that the diﬀerence in the probability of paying bribes
between a competitive and a declining ﬁrm increases with the frequency of bribing.
Our results on this should thus remain inconclusive.
18Table 7: Multinomial Logit Estimation: Administrative Corruption
Model 2.rest
Explanatory Dependent Variable: Administrative Corruption
Variables Seldom Sometimes Often Mostly Always
Evasion:10 1 0.92a 1.20a 1.13a 1.29a 0.63
(0.35) (0.32) (0.33) (0.35) (0.46)
Evasion2:10 3 -1.23b -1.16a -1.28a -1.29a -0.40
(0.54) (0.43) (0.45) (0.47) (0.54)
Compet -1.13a -1.34a -1.53a -2.49a -2.25a
(0.32) (0.38) (0.37) (0.52) (0.66)
Capital:10 9 -0.05c -0.35 -0.32 -0.55c -3.98
(0.03) (0.22) (0.20) (0.32) (8.53)
Nbemp:10 2 -0.25c -0.54b -0.47 -0.34b -1.28c
(0.14) (0.21) (0.34) (0.15) (0.77)
InsurFin:101 -3.69a -3.62a -3.61a -3.51a -3.47a
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10)
Hotel:101 -3.59a -0.08 -3.55a -3.50a -3.45a
(0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Transport -0.24 -36.03a -35.92a -35.08a -34.71a
(1.13) (0.60) (0.57) (0.68) (0.79)
BuildInd -12.04a 22.16 22.66a 23.19a -10.91a
(0.93) . (1.10) (1.08) (0.98)
Observations 213
Log-Likelihood -264.73
Notes: The reference modality stands for never being involved in administrative
corruption. By hypothesis, all the coeﬃcients of such a modality are null.
Standard errors in parentheses: a denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level, b
at the 5% level and c at 10%. Residuals heteroscedasticity is corrected
with White’s method.
Like ordered probit estimations, multinomial logit estimations show the existence of
a quadratic relation between the extent of tax evasion and administrative corruption.
And the probability of turning to administrative corruption (seldom or mostly) dimin-
ishes with the size of the ﬁnancial capital.
In brief, the main results are robust to the cut of the modalities of the variables of inter-
est, administrative corruption and state capture, but also to the econometric method.
The loss of competitiveness is relevant in explaining the engagement in corruption and
its frequency, whereas tax evasion is critical for resorting to administrative corruption
and its intensity. An exception is the failing enforcement of property rights, which
signiﬁcantly explains behaviors of frequent state capture rather than the decision of
being involved in state capture (at a low level).
6.2 Is There an Endogeneity Bias?
If tax evasion is determined endogenously, i.e. if it is correlated with the error term,
the analysis may suﬀer from an endogeneity bias9. There is a simultaneity bias if
9Endogenity may be due to measurement errors, simultaneity bias or omitted variables. One
example of an omitted variable is the legitimacy of the government. If the government has little
19corruption, in turn, aﬀects tax evasion. Ordinary least squares regressions performed
on aggregated data (Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999), Johnson et al.
(2000)) or ﬁrm-level data (Johnson et al. 2000) show that, in former-USSR countries,
shadow activity increases with the level of corruption. In most corrupt countries, hiding
sales is a way to bypass corrupt agents (Vostroknutova 2003).
As shown above, the determinants of the engagement in and the frequency of bribe-
paying are very similar. And computing instrumentation is much easier in a binary
choice model than in an ordered polytomous model. Hence I estimate an instrumented
probit model to control and test for the endogeneity of tax evasion in the regression of
administrative corruption10. I use the same speciﬁcation as in model 2.rest in Table 2.
I use three diﬀerent variables to predict the instrumented value of tax evasion.
• Household stands for the mean value of the number of persons depending ﬁ-
nancially on the ﬁrm’s employees. It is taken from the employee survey, which
increases the chance of exogeneity. We make the assumption that the more de-
pendents a worker has, the lower his negotiation power and the less likely she is
to refuse a job in a fraudulent ﬁrm. It is indeed likely that the illegal activities
of the ﬁrm are a source of job insecurity for the employee, and that the employee
has some information on these illegal activities. I expect a positive correlation
between the size of employees’ households and tax evasion.
• Tax is the level of taxes actually paid by the ﬁrm, as a percentage of her sales.
I expect a negative correlation between Tax and tax evasion.
• LaborReg is equal to 1 if the ﬁrm fully respects labor regulations, 0 otherwise.
When ﬁrms consider they face too restrictive regulations, they tend to hide part
of their activity rather than pay bribes (Frye and Zhuravskaya 2001). As shown
in Table 11 in the Appendix, Tax and LaborReg are not signiﬁcantly correlated
to administrative corruption.
I present the results of the ﬁrst step of instrumentation in Table 12 in the Appendix
and the results of the instrumented probit estimation in Table 13.
The instruments have the expected and signiﬁcant eﬀects on tax evasion. They are
weak instruments as indicated by the weak value of the Fisher statistic (2.52). Indeed,
Staiger and Stock (1997) show that an F-stat below 10 reﬂects weak instruments. How-
ever, the instruments explain 15% of the variance of tax evasion and their coeﬃcients
are signiﬁcant at most at the 8%-level. Although insuﬃcient, the instruments are good
legitimacy, individuals tend to circumvent taxes either by under-reporting their activity or by paying
bribes (Rose-Ackerman 2004).
10The results of the estimation of state capture by instrumented probit estimation are not reported
here for two main reasons: (i) tax evasion is likely to be aﬀected by a kind of corruption aiming at
altering the application of laws more than their formulation; (ii) when state capture is introduced as
an explanatory variable in the regression of tax evasion, a Wald exogeneity test shows the absence of
endogeneity.
20predictors of tax evasion. As indicated by the Amemiya-Lee-Newey (ALN) overidenti-
ﬁcation test in Table 13, the instruments are exogenous to corruption, hence valid. I
can therefore test the hypothesis of endogeneity of tax evasion. Wald exogeneity test
shows that, for all speciﬁcations, tax evasion is exogenous.
The exogeneity of tax evasion derives from the exact kind of corruption we are studying
here. There would be inverse causation if ﬁrms hide a bigger share of their sales in order
to pay bribes less often. However, while the proﬁtability of a ﬁrm aﬀects the amount
of bribes it has to pay (Svensson 2003), it is not likely that it aﬀects the frequency of
bribe-paying. Moreover, bribes are not only paid to bureaucrats who know about the
ﬁrms’ sales but to a much larger variety of public oﬃcials. Corruption here cannot be
interpreted as a tax on proﬁt but rather as a way to distort the market conditions or
to keep illegal activities secret. It is therefore unlikely to aﬀect the level of tax evasion.
The instrumented estimation shows diﬀerent results only for the control variables. The
main variables of interest have the same eﬀects on administrative corruption as in the
main estimation, which are shown to be robust in the absence of endogeneity.
6.3 Is There a Selection Bias?
In the sample I use, 41.31% of ﬁrms do not answer the question on the frequency of
state capture, 36.14 on the frequency of administrative corruption. Figure 4 in the
Appendix displays non-response rates by country. If non-response is not random and if
it has an inﬂuence on the frequency of state capture, then inference based on classical
ordered probit estimations is biased. The selection bias is due to the restriction of the
analysis to a sample not randomly selected.
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From equations (4) and (5), I derive:
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′
2iβ2 + E(u2i|x1i,y1i = 1). (7)
21There is a selection bias if the error terms u1i and u2i are correlated, that is to say
if E(u2i|x1i,y1i = 1) ̸= 0. In this case, classical ordered probit estimations yield
inconsistent estimators.
Several methods may be used for treating this issue. Tobit models are not appropriate
for two reasons: they apply to continuous data and they require that all determinants
of non-response are common with those of the frequency of corruption. Heckman
selection models enable some of the factors of non-response to be speciﬁc to the equation
of selection but they also apply to continuous endogenous variables in the equation of
interest. Here, I use a censored ordered probit model which ﬁts with ordered polytomic
endogenous variables in the equation of interest and which makes it possible to have
diﬀerent variables (as well as common ones) in both equations.
As suggested in Heckman (1979), I include a correction term for E(u2i|x1i,y1i = 1) to
take into account a potential selection bias. I assume that
E(u2i|x1i,y1i = 1) = γ[y1i − E(y1i|xi)]. (8)





2iβ2 + γ[y1i − ϕ(x
′
1i b β1)] + η2. (9)
I run a two-step procedure. The results are presented in Table 8. First, I run a
probit regression on the selection equation which helps to highlight the main fac-
tors of response to the questions on state capture (ﬁrst column) and on administra-
tive corruption (third column). From this regression, I build the estimated residual
Selection = y1i − ϕ(x′
1i b β1) = c u1i. Secondly, I estimate the equation of interest by
ordered probit. I regress the frequency of state capture (column 2) and administrative
corruption (column 4) on relevant factors retained in section 5 and augmented with
the variable Selection.
In columns ResponseSC and ResponseAC, I report the results of probit estimations
of the factors of answer. The ﬁnal speciﬁcation is retained according to the same
procedure as the one described for the main model (see section 5).
The correction term Selection included among regressors in the two equations of in-
terest (1.rest.S) and (2.rest.S) has a very high z-statistic in both regressions, state
capture and administrative corruption. This implies that there are no signiﬁcant un-
observable characteristics which determine both the probability of response (P(y1i = 1)
and the expected frequency of corruption (E(y∗
2i|x1i)): the selection bias is not signiﬁ-
cant. As a robustness test for the existence of a selection bias, I calculate the likelihood
ratio based on the null hypothesis that the parameter vector of the model satisﬁes the
selection constraint. The likelihood ratio is equal to 15.24 with an associated p-value
of 0.00. Hence, the Heckman ordered probit estimation can be considered equivalent
to the combination of a probit for response and an ordered probit for the outcome, i.e.
the frequency of corruption.
The probability of answering the question on the frequency of state capture signiﬁcantly
decreases with the respect of ﬁscal regulations and the age of the ﬁrm. Firms settled
22Table 8: Selection Bias: Heckman Ordered Probit Estimations









































Observations 534 212 508 201
Log-likelihood -346.20 -231.62 -310.20 -263.74
Method probit oprobit probit oprobit
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: a denotes signiﬁcance at
the 1% level, b at the 5% level and c at 10%. Residuals
heteroscedasticity is corrected with White’s method.
23in Morocco are more likely to answer such a question. In the same way, older ﬁrms are
more likely to censor themselves on their engagement in administrative corruption, as
well as Tunisian ﬁrms and ﬁrms with a higher share of national capital (private or pub-
lic) relative to foreign capital. Then, the probability of self-censoring on administrative
corruption is higher for ﬁrms in building or electrical sectors. However, as mentioned,
self-censorship does not have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the frequency of both forms of
corruption. And the signiﬁcance of the most relevant factors of corruption of the two
main speciﬁcations are not aﬀected by the introduction of the correction term.
7 Comparison with Corruption Supply in Uganda
and transition countries
In this section, I seek to compare ﬁrms’ behaviors towards corruption in the Maghreb,
in transition countries and in Uganda.
7.1 Corruption in Maghreb, Uganda and former-USSR
In their inﬂuential paper, Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2000) lead econometric
analyses on the determinants of state capture and administrative corruption in 22
transition countries11. They show that state capture is more often practiced by large
ﬁrms (i.e. with a high number of employees), whereas administrative corruption seems
to be rather speciﬁc to small ﬁrms. Firms which suﬀer from a weak enforcement of
their property and contract rights, those which cannot resort to other bureaucrats
when the ﬁrst one asks for bribes, as well as de novo ﬁrms, are more likely to engage in
both forms of corruption. Indeed, partly public ﬁrms in these countries were shown to
have privileged links with the state, which allowed them to inﬂuence regulation without
having recourse to bribery. Hence, they were less likely to engage in corruption than de
novo ones. Finally, neither state capture nor administrative corruption is signiﬁcantly
aﬀected by market power (proxied by the inelasticity of the demand faced by ﬁrms).
Svensson’s study on Ugandan ﬁrms does not make the distinction between state capture
and administrative corruption but it has the advantage of being based on quantitative
data on the amount of bribes paid. Corruption is higher for ﬁrms with a higher ability
to pay (measured by their proﬁtability) and for ﬁrms with a lower refusal power, which
depends on the alternative return on the ﬁrms’ capital stock. The extent of control
rights of bureaucrats, as high as regulations, taxes and public services concerning the
ﬁrm, enhances the level of bribes paid as well.
In the previous section, I only commented on the eﬀects of variables relevant for the
explanation of the supply of corruption in North Africa. Now, I also mention factors
11Their study also deals with the factors of inﬂuence, which I do not broach here.
24which happened to be relevant for the analysis of the determinants of corruption in the
former USSR (see Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2000)) and in Uganda (see Svensson
(2003)) and introduced in initial models (1.unrest) and (2.unrest). For detailed results
on the restriction procedure, see Tables 10 and 11 in Appendix.
First, the most striking diﬀerence concerns the impact of competitiveness. The results
show that in North Africa, the ﬁrms that engaged the most in corruption are the least
competitive ones, and not the most proﬁtable ones as in Uganda12. In Maghreb, bribe-
paying enables ﬁrms to reduce some costs or obtain public procurement contracts and
therefore to compensate a waning position (Gauthier and Reinikka 2001). In Uganda,
on the contrary, the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability is a good proxy for her ability to pay bribes,
which attracts a high demand for “surplus-shifting”, comparable to racket.
Besides, North African ﬁrms are more likely to engage in state capture when their
property and contract rights are not enforced or are badly enforced, the impact on
petty corruption not being signiﬁcant, whereas a failing legal system strengthens both
forms of corruption in transition countries.
Contrary to the situation in transition countries, diﬀerences in the links North African
ﬁrms may have with the state do not signiﬁcantly explain diﬀerences in their engage-
ment in both forms of corruption. If corruption in former USSR countries is sensitive
to the origin of the ﬁrm (de novo, privatized or public) and to the ﬁnancial stake of
the state, it is not the case in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Then, levels of taxes and
perceptions on regulations do not aﬀect corruption supply of North African ﬁrms, un-
like Ugandan ﬁrms, probably because the “burden” eﬀect of regulation is captured by
tax evasion which might be the answer to restrictive taxes and regulations (Johnson,
Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton 1998). Another interesting comparison with corruption
practices in other regions lies in the role of bureaucratic recourse13. In Uganda, ﬁrms
with a higher refusal power pay less bribes. Similarly, in transition countries, ﬁrms
which can have recourse to another oﬃcial in case of bribe-appeal, hence which have
a higher refusal power, pay bribes less often because bureaucrats are then in greater
competition for the supply of the public good. In North African countries, bureau-
cratic recourse does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect corruption practices. Like in the former
USSR, small ﬁrms are more likely to engage in administrative corruption in North
Africa. However, they are also more likely to practice state capture in North Africa
where fewer practice this kind of corruption compared with ﬁrms in the former USSR.
With regard to Uganda, the size of the ﬁrm is not decisive. Finally, the existence of
sector-speciﬁc eﬀects is restricted to the North African situation. In Svensson (2003),
industrial category dummies are not signiﬁcant for Uganda. As for transition countries,
12I use the variation of the market share of the ﬁrm as a proxy for its proﬁtability and competitive-
ness. This is diﬀerent from examining the market share as a stock. The latter is not a good proxy
for competitiveness or proﬁtability since a state monopoly might not be competitive or proﬁtable. It
might be one of the reasons why when Svensson (2003) introduces this stock index, it does not appear
to explain signiﬁcantly the level of bribes.
13Bureaucratic recourse stands for the possibility for an individual to have recourse to another
public agent when the ﬁrst one seeks bribes. It is one dimension of the refusal power.
25sectorial dummies are not introduced in the analysis of the determinants of corruption.
7.2 Are Hellman et al.'s results still valid?
Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann’s (2000) results presented above are based on 1999
data, collected in the BEEPS survey, which cover 22 former-USSR countries. To be
able to compare their results to mine as rigorously as possible, I need to ensure that the
potential diﬀerences are not due to the diﬀerent time spans under study. I therefore
check the validity of Hellman et al.’s results over a longer period before drawing the
comparison.
The BEEPS survey was conducted ﬁrst in 1999, and again in 2002 and 2005 with more
than 5000 ﬁrms. In this section, I use the 1999, 2002 and 2005 data and a pseudo-panel
estimation method to test the validity of the results obtained on 1999 data across time.
A classical panel estimation is not suitable here because the ﬁrms surveyed are diﬀerent
in 1999, 2002 and 2005.
The pseudo-panel estimation method was introduced by Deaton (1985). A ﬁxed-eﬀects
model based on transversal data repeated over time can be identiﬁed and estimated
consistently. Deaton (1985) suggests to the creation of cohorts of individuals with
common characteristics, which can be observed every year and are constant over time.
For each variable, the value of a cohort is given by the mean of the variable for the
individuals in the cohort14. The means for each cohort are therefore considered as single
observations in a pseudo-panel and I can apply classical panel estimation techniques.
I build 220 cohorts, composed of ﬁrms in the same country, created the same year
and I estimate the following equation, like in Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2000),
with data from 1999, 2002 and 2005, thereby introducing for the ﬁrst time a temporal
dimension in the analysis of the BEEPS data15:
Corrupct = α1 + α2PropRightsct + α3Competct + α4Recoursect
+ α5Nbempct + α6Originct + ϵct. (10)
The variables are measured as in the survey on Maghrebi ﬁrms with three major
exceptions.
When Corrup refers to administrative corruption, it is measured by the percent of
revenues ﬁrms typically pay per annum in unoﬃcial payments to public oﬃcials.
The question on insecurity of property rights which Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann
(2000) use refers to the situation in 1996 in the 1999 survey. In 2002 and 2005, the
14In this sample, each cohort is composed of 68 ﬁrms on average.
15This enables me to take into account speciﬁc individual eﬀects, which are actually cohort eﬀects
here.
26same question is asked but refers to the present situation. To be consistent, I compute
the variable PropRights (referring to the situation three years before) for 2002 and
2005 by using the mean of the cohort in 1999 and 2002 respectively.
The ﬁrm’s competitiveness is measured here by the elasticity of the inelasticity of de-
mand for the ﬁrm’s major product line.
The results are presented in Table 14 in Appendix. The results of the Hausman test
reﬂect that the speciﬁcation with random eﬀects should be rejected in the ﬁrst re-
gression of administrative corruption, yielding non eﬃcient estimators. In the other
regressions, the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimators are consistent and the random-eﬀects ones are
eﬃcient. The goodness of ﬁt is quite low and many coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant at
the 10%-level. One reason could be that the pseudo-panel technique induces a loss
of information but it could also be the case that ﬁrms practices of corruption have
changed over time and are driven by other factors in 2002 and 2005.
To try and improve the goodness of ﬁt and to be able to draw comparisons with the
main results on Maghrebi ﬁrms, I include Evasion and Tax in the set of explanatory
variables and I estimate the same model as in Section 5 with the BEEPS data. The
results are presented in Table 15 in Appendix.
The determinants of corruption put forward by Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2000)
do not seem very stable over time: the speciﬁcation of the model of state capture
is particularly poor when introducing the 2002 and 2005 data. However, the main
results on administrative corruption are still valid and are consistent with some of
our ﬁndings on ﬁrms in Maghreb. The ﬁrms most likely to engage in administrative
corruption are small ﬁrms, which face high judicial insecurity and have low bureaucratic
recourse. Moreover, a weak competitive position favors administrative corruption. This
result reinforces the assumption made above that corruption is a response to a loss of
competitiveness. Finally, like in Maghreb, tax evasion favors administrative corruption
as well, but I ﬁnd no threshold eﬀect for former-USSR ﬁrms.
8 Conclusion
The database I use provides new information on North African ﬁrms. In this paper, I
seek to highlight the main factors of administrative corruption and state capture in this
region, of both engagement in these two forms of corruption and frequency. I control
for a potential selection bias and compare corruption behaviors in Maghreb, transition
countries and Uganda.
The joint analysis of the main factors of administrative corruption and state capture
in Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian formal ﬁrms reveals some striking results.
First, tax evasion and corruption go hand-in-hand. But, contrary to what studies on
transition countries have revealed, in North Africa, it is true only up to a certain point,
27and only for administrative corruption. When hidden sales are over about half of total
sales, the likelihood to detect and punish the illegal activity of the ﬁrm is very high. In
this case, decreasing tax evasion lowers this risk and enables the ﬁrm to pay more bribes
– potentially to maintain some hidden activity. On the contrary, if the percentage of
undeclared sales is below half of total sales, the risk of being caught is low and tax
evasion and administrative corruption are complements.
Second, the quality of the legal and judicial system inﬂuences state capture, in a similar
way as tax evasion inﬂuences administrative corruption. Firms which face a failing
legal system and are not able to enforce their property rights, resort more often to state
capture, thereby having a direct inﬂuence on the formulation of laws. However, whereas
tax evasion and competitiveness inﬂuence both the decision to engage in corruption
and its frequency, the protection of property rights appears to aﬀect only the frequency
of engagement.
Third, whereas state capture appears as an answer to insecure property rights and
administrative corruption as a way to maintain part of the activity hidden, both forms
of corruption help compensate decreasing competitiveness and low proﬁtability. North
African ﬁrms which engage more in corruption are not the most proﬁtable ones, as
Svensson (2003) suggests for Ugandan ﬁrms, but are the most threatened by compe-
tition. Low competitiveness incites ﬁrms to turn to bribery to inﬂuence the content
or application of laws and regulations to their advantage in order to win back their
position on the market or to hamper their competitors. Hence, these results are in line
with the implications of Bliss and Tella’s theoretical model: increasing competition
may not reduce corruption. Yet the argument I make is diﬀerent. While Bliss and
Tella (1997) suggest that the least competitive ﬁrms exit and those which stay are
the most proﬁtable and can pay higher bribes, I argue that the least proﬁtable ﬁrms
engage more in corruption in order not to exit. This conclusion contrasts with previous
studies showing that the competitive position does not explain signiﬁcantly the supply
of corruption in transition countries (see e.g. Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2000)).
Economic policy recommendations are manyfold. This study emphasizes the necessity
to settle diﬀerent anti-corruption policies according i) to the diﬀerent regions in the
world, some factors of corruption being speciﬁc to some regions (e.g. refusal power)
and some others having opposite eﬀects in two diﬀerent regions (e.g. proﬁtability); ii)
to the form of corruption that ought to be fought in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. If
priority is given to the ﬁght against state capture, then the legal and judicial system
has to be reinforced so as to enforce property and contract rights in a more accurate
way. But if priority is given to reducing administrative corruption, tax evasion has to
be fought16 with special attention to the market structure. Since the relation between
tax evasion and administrative corruption is not linear, it may be counter-productive
to try and restrain tax evasion (if it exceeds a certain threshold). However, limiting
both forms of corruption may require controlling for the activity of ﬁrms losing their
16Such a recommendation focuses on the reduction of corruption and omits public choice analyses
which emphasize the positive eﬀect of tax evasion on households’ revenues.
28competitiveness, especially when competition increases in a given sector.
The ratiﬁcation of various free-trade agreements by Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria has
accelerated trade openness. As a consequence, in the short run, many ﬁrms have
reduced their proﬁts on the domestic market, favoring corruption. Though in the long
run ﬁrms may gain market share and proﬁts, thereby reducing corruption, this may
explain why, despite the institutional reforms carried out over the last years, corruption
has not really been constrained yet in North Africa.
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31Appendix
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics
Label Variable Description Obs Mean Std Err Min Max
Capture State Do ﬁrms like yours have to give 341 1.81 1.27 1 6
Capture public oﬃcials unoﬃcial payments
to inﬂuence the content of a law or
regulation? 1: never; 2: seldom;
3: sometimes; 4: often; 5: mostly;
6: always
Admcorr Administrative Do ﬁrms like yours usually have to 371 2.27 1.54 1 6
Corruption give public oﬃcials unoﬃcial
payments to be able to work?
1: never; 2: seldom; 3: sometimes;
4: often; 5: mostly; 6: always
Evasion Tax In your opinion, what percentage of 433 11.75 19.79 0 87.5
Evasion their sales do ﬁrms in your sector do
not declare to the authorities? %
Corrstart Corruption: Do ﬁrms like yours have to give 316 1.99 0.99 1 4
Starting public oﬃcials unoﬃcial payments
an Activity to start their activity? 1: never;
2: sometimes; 3: often; 4: always
Corrproc Corruption: Do ﬁrms like yours have to give 359 2.50 1.16 1 4
Accelerating public oﬃcials unoﬃcial payments
administrative to accelerate administrative
procedures procedures? 1: never; 2: sometimes;
3: often; 4: always
Compet Competition: During the last two years, has your 522 0.77 0.42 0 1
Variation of market share increased or stayed
Market share stable: 1; decreased: 0
PropRights Property Three years ago, did you trust courts 532 0.67 0.47 0 1
Rights to enforce your contract and property
rights in case of commercial conﬂict?
0: no, not at all or no, not really;
1: yes, rather or yes, deﬁnitely
Recourse Bureaucratic Do you agree with what follows: 552 0.91 0.30 0 1
Recourse “If a public oﬃcial acts against
the rules I can usually go to another
oﬃcial or to his superior and get
the correct treatment without
recourse to unoﬃcial payments.”
Tax Corporate What is the level of corporate taxes 311 28.64 20.87 0 100
Taxes (as a percentage of your sales)?
Regul Respect of Do you manage to respect ﬁscal 552 0.91 0.30 0 1
Regulation regulations? 0: partially;
1: totally
32Label Variable Description Obs Mean Std Err Min Max
Capital Capital What is the amount of capital of your 450 2.69 21.75 5.10 5 362.14
ﬁrm? (in billion Algerian Dinars)
CEO Status: CEO What is your position in the ﬁrm? 575 0.28 0.45 0 1
1: CEO; 0: other
Nbemp Size of How many employees do you have 549 120.22 224.59 10 2326
the ﬁrm in your ﬁrm?
Y ear Year of When was your ﬁrm set up? % 567 1985.62 14.58 1848 2004
Foundation
PubCap Partly Public What is the public share in your 528 14.74 35.06 0 100
Firm ﬁrms capital? %
ForCap Foreign What is the foreign share in your 528 9.07 26.25 0 100
Capital ﬁrms capital? %
Tunisia Country: Where is your ﬁrm located? 581 0.34 0.48 0 1
Tunisia 1: Tunisia; 0: other
Morocco Country: Where is your ﬁrm located? 581 0.30 0.46 0 1
Morocco 1:Morocco; 0: other
InsurFin Sector: In what sector is your main activity? 569 0.03 0.18 0 1
Insurance Insurance and ﬁnancial services
Hotel Sector: In what sector is your main activity? 569 0.06 0.24 0 1
Hotel Hotels and restaurants
Transp Sector: In what sector is your main activity? 569 0.04 0.20 0 1
Transport Transport
Trade Sector: In what sector is your main activity? 569 0.17 0.37 0 1
Trade Trade
BuildInd Sector: In what sector is your main activity? 569 0.06 0.24 0 1
Building Building materials, glass
FoodInd Sector: In what sector is your main activity? 569 0.12 0.32 0 1
Food-Process. Food-Processing industries
ChemicInd Sector: In what sector is your main activity? 569 0.07 0.25 0 1
Chemical Chemical industries
TextilInd Sector: In what sector is your main activity? 569 0.17 0.37 0 1
Textile Textile, leather, clothing, shoe
ElecInd Sector: In what sector is your main activity? 569 0.09 0.29 0 1
Electrical Electrical, electronics, electrical
goods, mechanical engineering,
metallurgical industry
LaborReg Respect of Do you manage to respect labor 557 0.80 0.40 0 1
Labor Regulation regulations? 0: partially;
1: totally
Household Household How many people depend on you 558 2.80 1.34 0 8.33
Size ﬁnancially?
33Table 10: Restriction of the Speciﬁcation: State Capture
Model 1.unrest 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.rest
Explanatory
Variables Dependent Variable: State Capture
Evasion:10 1 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.34 -0.08 -0.07
(0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.14) (0.13)
Evasion2:10 3 -0.44 -0.43 -0.42 -0.43 0.14 0.14 0.05
(0.35) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.21) (0.20) (0.09)
Compet -0.78a -0.79a -0.78a -0.78a -0.69a -0.69a -0.68a -0.76a -0.59a -0.64a -0.68a -0.66a -0.69a
(0.23) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) (0.18)
PropRights -0.41 -0.41 -0.43 -0.44 -0.37c -0.39c -0.38c -0.44b -0.37b -0.38b -0.38b -0.28 -0.36b
(0.28) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Recourse 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 -0.15 -0.17 -0.14 -0.13
(0.45) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.27) (0.27) (0.26) (0.23)
Tax:10 2 0.44 0.44 0.38 0.39
(0.90) (0.92) (0.88) (0.88)
Regul 0.11
(1.15)
Capital:10 9 -0.75b -0.75b -0.77b -0.72c -0.44c -0.45c -0.43c -0.48a -0.40b -0.26b -0.29b -0.30b -0.30b
(0.35) (0.36) (0.36) (0.38) (0.24) (0.24) (0.22) (0.18) (0.16) (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14)
CEO 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.41b 0.40b 0.40b 0.40b 0.39b 0.36b 0.39b 0.49a 0.44b
(0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Nbemp:10 2 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.10 -0.11 -0.10 -0.13b -0.11b -0.05
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Age:10 1 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
PubCap:10 1 0.19c 0.19b 0.19b 0.19b 0.07 0.08c 0.08c 0.09b 0.05
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
ForCap:10 2 0.12 0.14
(0.48) (0.48)
Tunisia 0.36 0.37 0.39 0.40 -0.43 -0.36 -0.37 -0.41c -0.34 -0.39c -0.36c -0.36c -0.34c
(0.67) (0.61) (0.62) (0.62) (0.33) (0.27) (0.27) (0.25) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Morocco 0.67 0.66 0.68 0.69 -0.14



















Observations 110 111 111 111 167 167 167 187 204 214 222 217 217
Log-Likelihood -112.4 -112.8 -112.8 -112.9 -190.1 -190.2 -190.4 -206.0 -225.3 -236.8 -246.7 -235.0 -239.2
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: a denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level, b at the 5% level and c at 10%.
Residuals heteroscedasticity is corrected with White’s method.
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35Figure 3: Distributional Plots of Three Main Factors of Corruption
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36Table 11: Restriction of the Speciﬁcation: Administrative Corruption
Model 2.unrest 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 2.11 2.rest
Explanatory
Variables Dependent Variable: Administrative Corruption
Evasion:10 1 0.47b 0.47b 0.47a 0.48a 0.47a 0.52a 0.43a 0.43a 0.44a 0.45a 0.37a 0.38a
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Evasion2:10 3 -0.39 -0.40 -0.40 -0.41c -0.40 -0.46c -0.36a -0.40a -0.40a -0.43a -0.32b -0.33b
(0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Compet -0.46c -0.46c -0.47c -0.47c -0.47c -0.39 -0.53a -0.57a -0.59a -0.57a -0.55a -0.53a
(0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.21) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.19)
PropRights -0.16 -0.16 -0.17 -0.15 -0.14
(0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
Recourse 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.35 0.49 0.07
(0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.33) (0.31) (0.21)
Tax:10 2 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.62 0.63 0.37
(0.76) (0.74) (0.75) (0.70) (0.70) (0.67)
Regul -0.03 -0.02
(0.48) (0.46)
Capital:10 9 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09a -0.08a -0.07a -0.07a -0.07a -0.07a
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
CEO 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.33 0.31c 0.29c 0.26 0.29c 0.25
(0.27) (0.25) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17)
Nbemp:10 2 -0.19b -0.19b -0.19b -0.20b -0.19b -0.21a -0.19a -0.17a -0.14a -0.15a -0.16a -0.16a
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Age:10 1 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.10c 0.09
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
PubCap:10 1 0.12b 0.12b 0.12b 0.12b 0.11b 0.10b 0.06c 0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)




Morocco 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.12



















Observations 116 116 117 117 117 121 188 203 213 216 210 213
Log-Likelihood -133.6 -133.6 -134.0 -134.0 -134.1 -141.1 -246.9 -266.6 -279.3 -283.7 -270.4 -277.5
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: a denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level, b at the 5% level and c at 10%.
Residuals heteroscedasticity is corrected with White’s method.





















F stat. 2.52b 1.94c
Observations 127 127
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: a denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level, b
at the 5% level and c at 10%. Residuals heteroscedasticity is corrected
with White’s method.
38Table 13: Instrumented Probit Estimation
Model 2.rest.IV.1 2.rest.IV.2 2.rest.IV.3 2.rest.IV.4
Explanatory Administrative
Variables Corruption
Evasion:10 1 1.20c 1.20c 1.45b 1.43b
(0.72) (0.71) (0.68) (0.66)
Main Evasion2:10 3 -1.48 -1.48 -2.12b -2.07b
Variables (1.16) (1.16) (1.08) (1.05)
Compet -0.43 -0.44 -0.50c -0.54b
(0.29) (0.29) (0.27) (0.27)
Capital:10 9 -0.04 -0.04
Firms' (0.07) (0.07)
Characteristics Nbemp:10 2 -0.15 -0.15 -0.00
(0.10) (0.10) (0.07)
InsurFin:101 dropped dropped dropped dropped
Hotel:101 -0.06 -0.06 -0.11c -0.11c
Sector (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Transport -0.12
(0.79)
BuildInd dropped dropped dropped dropped
Observations 127 127 158 160
2 Wald 13.15c 12.64b 13.60b 13.79a
Overidentication 2 ALN 1.02 1.03 1.07 1.12
Test P-value 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.29
F stat. 1e et. Fraude 2.52a 2.85a 5.41a 6.59a
Instruments R2 1e et. Fraude 0.15 0.14 0.18 0.18
Relevance F stat. 1e et. Fraude2 1.94a 2.23a 4.39a 5.23a
R2 1e et. Fraude2 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.15
Test 2 Wald 0.38 0.41 2.13 1.97
d'exognit Prob > 2 0.83 0.81 0.35 0.37
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: a denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level, b at the 5% level and c at 10%.
Residuals heteroscedasticity is corrected with White’s method.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































41Table 15: Validity of Hellman et al.’s Results: Extensions
Dependent Administrative Corruption State Capture
Variable
Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random
Eﬀects Eﬀects Eﬀects Eﬀects Eﬀects Eﬀects Eﬀects Eﬀects
Origin: DeNovo -0.29 1.27b 0.12 0.68 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.01
(-0.26) (2.04) (0.11) (1.17) (-0.59) (0.23) (-0.65) (0.36)
Privatized 0.70 1.64b 0.79 1.50b 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00
(0.72) (2.31) (0.88) (2.29) (0.63) (0.12) (0.55) (0.07)
Nbemp: Small -2.95b -2.05a 0.86 0.48 0.10c 0.04 0.10 0.01
(-2.56) (-2.60) (0.74) (0.62) (1.70) (0.93) (1.45) (0.23)
Medium -1.03 0.56 0.28 1.05 0.09 0.03 0.08 0.02
(-0.87) (0.65) (0.25) (1.30) (1.48) (0.75) (1.34) (0.53)
PropRights 0.50c 0.34b 0.36 0.41a 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
(1.86) (2.22) (1.44) (2.91) (0.22) (1.02) (0.20) (0.86)
Compet -0.97a -0.84a -0.43 -0.38 0.03c 0.02 0.03 0.01
(-2.95) (-3.39) (-1.38) (-1.63) (1.77) (1.30) (1.64) (0.87)
Recourse -0.14 -0.04 -0.33 -0.40a -0.03b -0.02c -0.03b -0.01
(-0.63) (-0.24) (-1.54) (-2.59) (-2.26) (-1.89) (-2.22) (-1.42)
Tax 1.16a 0.71a 0.04 -0.11 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
(4.95) (4.00) (0.14) (-0.59) (0.34) (0.18) (0.42) (1.03)
Evasion 0.09a 0.10a 0.05a 0.06a 0.00 0.00a 0.00 0.00a
(7.34) (9.62) (3.83) (6.39) (1.04) (2.59) (1.11) (3.19)
2002 -2.64a -2.53a 0.00 0.02
(-7.81) (-9.52) (0.12) (1.50)
2005 -2.84a -2.71a 0.01 0.03b
(-7.40) (-9.40) (0.35) (2.09)
Observations 547 547 547 547 547 547 547 547
R2 0.40 0.39 0.50 0.50 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05
Hausman Test 0.00 0.57 0.06 0.26
Notes: t-statistic in parentheses: a denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level, b at the 5% level and c at 10%.
42